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Recent Developments

TOWSON UNIVERSITY v. CONTE:
A Jury's Role in a Wrongful Discharge Case Does Not Include
that of Ultimate Fact-Finder

By: Kimmeria Bayton
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a jury's role in a
wrongful discharge case does not include that of ultimate fact-finder.
Towson University v. Conte, 384 Md. 68, 862 A.2d 941 (2004).
Additionally, the court held that in a just cause employment context, a
jury's role is to determine the objective reasonableness of the
employer's decision to discharge. Id.
In 1996, Towson University ("University") hired Dr. Michael
Conte ("Dr. Conte") as the director of the Regional Economic Studies
Institute at the University ("RESI"). At the time of his hire, Dr. Conte
signed an employment contract that detailed his duties as director,
including his compensation, period of employment and the causes for
which he could be terminated.
In 1998, several events occurred that led to the University's
decision to terminate Dr. Conte. The majority of these events
surrounded RESI's relationship with the State Department of Human
Resources ("DHR"), RESI' s primary revenue source. DHR, which
was entitled to compensation for any income generated by RESI using
DHR equipment, was concerned with the accounting of its
compensation. DHR complained that the accounting was both
inconsistent and incomprehensible. After unsuccessfully trying to
resolve its issues with RESI through Dr. Conte, the relationship
between DHR and Dr. Conte deteriorated. The provost, John Haeger,
was informed, and although the University was able to settle the
problems with DHR, it became very dissatisfied with Dr. Conte and
blamed him for the $2,300,000 reduction in DHR's contract the
following year.
After an internal investigation and a meeting to discuss RESI's
activities and accounting problems, Dr. Conte was informed of the
University's intent to fire him and their request that he resign. Dr.
Conte subsequently refused to resign and was sent a letter from the
University provost explaining that incompetence and willful neglect of
duty were the causes of his termination. After a brief hearing before
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the University president, Dr. Conte was formally terminated on
January 26, 1999.
Dr. Conte filed a complaint against the University in the
Circuit Court for Baltimore County alleging, inter alia, that the
University wrongfully discharged him and breached his employment
contract. The trial judge refused the University's request to instruct
the jury that if it found just cause to be required under the contract, the
University was still permitted to fire Dr. Conte for "common law
cause" or cause that goes to the "essence of the contract." The jury
returned the verdict in favor of Dr. Conte, finding that the University
failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that just cause
existed under the contract to fire Dr. Conte.
The University appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland, arguing that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that
the University was required to show just cause for the termination and
by refusing to instruct the jury on common law cause. The Court of
Special Appeals affirmed the circuit court's judgment. The Court of
Appeals granted certiorari to consider whether a jury may examine or
review the factual bases of an employer's decision to terminate an
employee and whether Dr. Conte's employment contract was
exclusive in its enumeration of the just cause for which Dr. Conte
could be terminated.
The Court began its analysis by reviewing the language of the
employment contract. !d. at 78, 862 A.2d 946. Dr. Conte's
employment contract contained a provision that set the time period of
his employment and a provision that permitted termination only for
cause. Id at 80, 862 A.2d at 948. Both provisions in the contract
independently established that Dr. Conte was not an at-will employee.
!d.
The Court also noted that the language of the contract was
ambiguous as to whether the fact-finding prerogative lay with the
University. !d. The Court found, however, that no matter how the
contract was interpreted, the University still retained the fact-finding
prerogative. !d. at 82, 862 A.2d at 948-49. Even so, because the
contract was ambiguous, the court decided to assume that Dr. Conte's
interpretation of the contract was correct and that it did not specify
who had the fact-finding prerogative. !d. at 82, 862 A.2d at 949.
The Court next proceeded to distinguish just cause employment
contracts, satisfaction employment contracts, and at- will employment
contracts. !d. In at-will contracts, courts have held that "a jury cannot
review any aspect of the employer's decision to terminate." !d. An
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employer in an at-will contract may terminate an employee for any
reason absent contravening public policy. Id. In a case involving a
satisfaction employment contract, a jury cannot review the factual
basis for an employer's termination, but it can review the employer's
subjective motivation. Id. at 83, 862 A.2d at 950. The jury must
determine whether the employer was truly dissatisfied with the
employee's services or simply just feigning dissatisfaction.Jd.
The Court of Appeals decided not to take the route of the lower
courts in permitting the jury to review the factual basis for the
employer's termination decision, but rather to review the objective
motivation of the employer to ensure that they acted in good faith. I d.
at 85, 862 A.2d at 950. The jury must determine whether the employer
acted "reasonably" and make sure that its decision did not result from
any arbitrary, capricious, or illegal reason. Id.
Next, the Court compared this case to two analogous cases. In
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 292
N.W.2d 880 (1980), the Michigan Supreme Court held that it is the
trier of fact, not the employer, that determines whether there was
sufficient cause to warrant the employees termination. Towson
University, 384 Md. at 86, 862 A.2d at 951. That court found that if
the employer were the final arbiter of the discharge, then its promise to
discharge only for just cause would be meaningless. Id.
In Simpson v. Western Graphics Corp., 293 Ore. 96, 643 P.2d
1276 (1982), however, the court held that when an employer contracts
to discharge only for just cause it does not forfeit its right to be the
ultimate fact-finder in determining whether just cause existed. Towson
University, 384 Md. at 86, 862 A.2d at 951. The employer only need
prove to the jury that the misconduct occurred by a preponderance of
the evidence. Id.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the court in Simpson that an
employer does not contract away his right to be the ultimate fact- finder
with regard to an employee's workplace performance. Id. at 87, 862
A.2d at 952. The court reversed the holding of the Court of Special
Appeals and decided not to interpret Dr. Conte's employment contract
as granting the jury the authority to decide the factual bases for his
termination. Id. Overall, the court found that, "if an employee is
required to have in hand a signed confession or an eyewitness account
of the alleged misconduct before it can act. .. effective decision making
[would] be thwarted." Id. at 88, 862 A.2d at 953. In this case, the
University alone was in the best position to determine if there were
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sufficient facts present to indicate incompetence and willful neglect of
duties. !d. at 89, 862 A.2d at 953.
In this holding, the Court of Appeals of Maryland effectively
limits the number of these disputes that will be placed on its docket.
Employees in these cases will be more likely to accept the decision of
their employer after exhausting the remedies set forth in their
contracts. To bring these cases to court, employees must have proof
that their termination was not reasonable or was arbitrary, capricious
or illegal.
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